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 Investigation of corruption, as an extra ordinary crime is granted to the 
three institutions, namely the Police, Attorney General and the 
Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The granting 
of authority to these three institutions aims to accelerate the eradication 
of corruption, not only detrimental to the finances and the economy of 
the country but has damaged the joints of life of the nation and state. 
The research is descriptive and uses a normative juridical approach. 
Aiming to find out, and analyze qualitatively the implications of 
regulating investigative authority over the eradication of corruption in 
Indonesia. The study found that all three institutions that were given 
the authority to investigate corruption crimes were administratively 
separated, but functionally these three institutions should collaborate 
to accelerate the eradication of corruption, but in practice this was not 
the case, each institution tended to be shackled by fragmentary and 
institutional nature. centric that does not support the eradication of 
corruption. This is because the regulation of the authority of each 
institution has not been strictly regulated, then the arrangements are 
not synchronized and among the existing legislation, so that there is 
overlap of authority due to differences in interpretation between 
investigators, which results in investigations not going well. 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2018 HALREV. All rights reserved. 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
Corruption is no longer felt as something that is only detrimental to the country's 
finances or economy, but should be seen as something that violates the social and 
economic rights of the community as part of human rights. Therefore, there are enough 
rational reasons to categorize corruption as an extraordinary crime, so that its 
eradication needs to be done in extraordinary ways and by using extraordinary legal 
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instruments (extra ordinary instrument).1 Corruption is no longer a local problem, but a 
transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies that encourage 
international cooperation to essentially prevent and control it. 2  These extraordinary 
ways are then manifested in the legislative policy into exceptional provisions which are 
deviant from the general rules of criminal law, including in the field of investigation.  
To find out the development of corruption in Indonesia compared to other Asian 
countries, which was released by Transparency International Indonesia for the 2001-2015 
Corruption Perception Index Trends, that in 2015 the Indonesian Corruption Perception 
Index scored 36, which means a 2-point increase (19 ratings) This score is still 4 points 
adrift of the ASEAN average (including Singapore), but promising if the positive trend 
can be maintained or even improved.3 
The position of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter, KPK), 
which was formed by Law No. 30 of 2002, as an alternative and independent institution 
that is authorized to conduct investigations other than the Police and Attorney's Office 
in eradicating corruption is expected to have a high ability of moral integrity; because of 
the fact that so far it has been described that the investigation of corruption crimes 
previously carried out by the Police and the Attorney General's Office, it turns out that 
in its implementation it creates legal problems at the level of implementation, tends not 
to be maximum and seems less capable in optimizing corruption. The existence of KPK 
is a manifestation of the legal response of the community that is legitimized by the State 
so that the KPK is able to play a more representative role in combating increasingly 
complex corruption.4 The position of the Police and the Attorney General's Office in an 
institutional structure is still under executive authority and having a command system 
that is subject to the orders of superiors, is one of the obstacles for the Police and 
prosecutors to be able to be objective in eradicating corruption.  
In practice, there is a struggle for authority between agencies authorized to investigate 
criminal acts of corruption, this is caused by the absence of uniform interpretation of 
existing legislation, overlapping authority arrangements and legal uncertainty, or it 
could be due to conflicting interests.5 The climax was after the conflict of authority 
between the Police and the KPK in the SIM simulator case involving corrupt police 
officers at the National Police Headquarters, finally the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, on 8 October 2012, expressed his hope that the 
KPK and the Police immediately renew the MoU.6 Responding to the above problems, 
this study tries to find out "What are the implications of regulating the authority of 
investigation on efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia?.  
2. Method 
This research is descriptive, using a normative legal approach, where the data used is 
secondary data consisting of primary legal material in the form of legislation relating to 
the regulation of the authority to investigate corruption in Indonesia, secondary legal 
                                                             
1   Elwi Danil, (2011), Korupsi Konsep, Tindak Pidana dan Pemberantasannya, Jakarta: PT Raj Grafindo Persada, 
p. 76 
2   United Nations Convention Againts Corruption, (2003), Preambule 4. 
3  Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) Republik Indonesia, (2015), Rencana Strategis (Renstra) KPK, 
Tahun 2015-2019, p. 1   
4  See, Moh. Hatta, (2015), KPK dan Sistem Peradilan Pidana. Yogyakarta: Liberty, p. 37-43 
5  Salahuddin Luthfie, (2011), Kewenangan Kejaksaan Dalam penydidikan Tindak pidana korupsi, Tesis, 
Fakultas Hukum, Pascasarjana Ilmu Hukum, Universitas Indonesia, 2011, p.41-43  
6   Jan S. Maringka, (2017), Reformasi Kejaksaan Dalam Sistem Hukum Nasional, Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, p. 17  
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material as legal material to clarify legal material primary in the form of books, 
documents, research results, etc., as well as tertiary legal material as a complement to 
the previous legal material in the form of a legal dictionary. Collection of legal material 
is carried out through document studies and literature studies. Legal materials obtained 
are grouped based on the problems studied (categorization) and labeled according to 
the problems studied, to facilitate if needed in conducting qualitative analysis, using 
legal hermeneutics.  
 
3. Regulation of the Authority for Investigation of Corruption  
3.1. Investigation of Corruption Crimes by the Police 
The legal substance of investigating corruption is found in the provisions of Article 26 
of Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption (1999 Corruption 
Law), stating that “Investigation, prosecution, and examination in court proceedings in 
cases of corruption, is done by law applicable criminal program, unless otherwise 
specified in this law”. If a grammatical interpretation is made of the sound of Article 26 
above, then the word “based on applicable criminal procedural law” means referring to 
Law Number 8 of 1981 concerning the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), 
as the only legal provision events that apply in Indonesia. Thus, the criminal act of 
investigation is carried out by investigators Article 106 to 136 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, which according to Articles 1 to 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code the 
investigation is the authority of the police.  
Then, in Article 14 paragraph (1) letter g of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the 
National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Police Law), and states that in carrying out 
the task of investigating and investigating all criminal acts in accordance with KUHAP 
and other laws and regulations. The Criminal Procedure Code provides a leading role 
to the Police in investigations and investigations, so that in general the authority to 
conduct investigations and investigations of all criminal acts is the authority of Police. 
However, it still pays attention to and does not reduce the authority possessed by other 
investigators in accordance with the laws and regulations which become their respective 
legal basis. 
Furthermore, in order to carry out investigative duties, the Police in general according 
to Article 15 paragraph (1), has the authority: (a) to receive reports or complaints; b) carry 
out special examinations as part of police actions in the context of prevention; c) take the 
first action on the scene; d) taking fingerprints and other identities and photographing 
someone; e) seeking information and evidence. Police actions according to the 
explanation in Article 15 are forced efforts or other acts according to law that are 
responsible for realizing orderly and upholding of the law and the establishment of 
public peace, while the information and evidence referred to are related to both the 
criminal process and the police duties in general. 
 
3.2. Investigation of Corruption by the Prosecutor's Office 
Article 284 paragraph (2) KUHAP jo. Article 17 Government Regulation number 27 of 
1983, and Article 30 paragraph (1) letter d of Law Number 16 of 2004 concerning the 
Prosecutor's Office, assigns tasks and authority to the Prosecutor in addition to 
prosecution as the main task, also authorized to conduct investigations on certain 
criminal acts based on the Law ". The particular criminal act according to the explanation 
of the article is regulated in Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Court 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 4(3): 356-365 
359 
 
and Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning Corruption Law No. 20 of 2001. Thus the 
Prosecutor's Office is the institution authorized to deal with criminal acts corruption can 
act as a public prosecutor who gets the results of an investigation (BAP) from the Police 
regarding corruption and can also act as a direct investigator.  
The authority of the prosecutor's office in investigating criminal acts of corruption is still 
being questioned, this can be seen from the existence of the Prosecutor's Office as an 
investigator in the case of criminal acts of corruption that cannot be fully understood 
with one opinion. There are still differences in interpretation among law enforcement 
officials, in its implementation there are still judges who in their decisions have not yet 
acknowledged the prosecutor as an investigator of corruption. The Supreme Court has 
provided an answer to respond to this issue by issuing an opinion or fatwa Number 
KMA/102/III/2005 dated March 9, 2005, essentially explaining that the Prosecutor has 
the authority to investigate corruption cases after the enactment of Law No. 31 of 1999 
Jo. Act Number 20 of 2001 with the basis of Article 26 and Article 27, Article 284 
paragraph (2) KUHAP and its explanation. Article 17 of Government Regulation 
Number 27 of 1983 Article 30 paragraph (1) letter d of Act Number 16 of 2004. Likewise, 
with the Constitutional Court stated that the authority of the Prosecutor in investigating 
corruption in Article 30 paragraph (1) letter d of the 2004 Prosecutor Law does not violate 
the 1945 Constitution. The reason is that the constitution does not prohibit the existence 
of a dual function carried out by the Prosecutor, as the president has a function as the 
holder of governmental power and legislator.7 
 
3.3. Investigation of Corruption Crimes by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) 
Article 6 of Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK Law), explicitly states that the duties of the KPK are: (1) coordination with 
agencies authorized to eradicate corruption; (2) supervision of agencies authorized to 
eradicate corruption; (3) conduct investigations, investigations, and prosecutions 
against corruption; (4) taking precautionary measures against corruption; and (5) 
monitor the administration of state government. 
In carrying out the tasks of investigation, investigation and prosecution as referred to 
in Article 6 letter c, the KPK is given more authority beyond the investigative authority 
as stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Code that is owned by the Police and the 
Attorney General's Office, so that the KPK is called a super body institution. The 
authority referred to in Article 12 paragraph (1) of the KPK Law is for: 
a. Tapping and recording conversations; 
b. Ordered relevant agencies to prohibit someone from traveling abroad; 
c. Request information from banks or other financial institutions about the financial 
condition of the suspect or defendant being examined; 
d. Ordered banks or other financial institutions to block accounts suspected to be the 
result of corruption belonging to the suspect, defendant, or other related parties; 
e. Ordered the leader or superior of the suspect to suspend the suspect from his 
position; 
                                                             
7  Lasmadi, S. (2010). Tumpang tindih kewenangan penyidikan pada tindak pidana korupsi dalam 
perspektif sistem peradilan pidana. Inovatif: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, Vol. 2 No. 3: 33-43. 
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f. Request suspect data and taxation data of the suspect or defendant to the relevant 
agency; 
g. Temporarily suspend a financial transaction, trade transaction and other 
agreement or temporarily revoke the license, license and concession that is carried 
out or owned by the suspect or defendant, which is allegedly based on sufficient 
initial evidence relating to corruption that is being examined; 
h. Request assistance from Interpol Indonesia or other state law enforcement 
agencies to conduct searches, arrests and confiscation of evidence abroad; 
i. Request the assistance of the police or other relevant agencies to carry out arrests, 
detention, searches and confiscations in cases of corruption that are being handled. 
However, in Article 38 paragraph (1) of the KPK Law and its explanation affirms that all 
authority relating to investigation, investigation and prosecution are regulated in the 
KUHAP, such as the authority to arrest, detain, search, confiscate, examine letters. Also 
applies to investigators, investigators and public prosecutors at the KPK. Furthermore, 
the KPK is based on Article 42 of the KPK Law, authorized to coordinate and control 
investigations, investigations and prosecutions of corruption committed jointly by 
people who are subject to military and general justice courts. 
In the event that a corruption crime occurs and the Corruption Eradication Commission 
has not conducted investigation, while the case has been carried out by the police or 
prosecutor's office, according to Article 50 paragraph (1) of the KPK Law, the agency 
must notify the Corruption Eradication Commission no later than 14 (fourteen) working 
day as of the date of the commencement of the investigation. (2) Investigations carried 
out by the police or prosecutor's office as referred to in paragraph (1) must be carried 
out in continuous coordination with the Corruption Eradication Commission. (3) In the 
event that the Corruption Eradication Commission has begun to conduct investigations 
as referred to in paragraph (1), the police or prosecutor's office will no longer conduct 
investigations. (4) In the event that the investigation is carried out simultaneously by the 
police or prosecutor's office and the Corruption Eradication Commission, the 
investigation carried out by the police or the prosecutor's office is immediately stopped. 
There is one more authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission which is 
considered to exceed the authority of the Police and Attorney Investigators, namely the 
authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission to take over cases that are being 
investigated by the Police and Attorney General's Office, as stipulated in Article 9 of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission Law. The Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) argued: (a) public reports regarding corruption were not followed up, (b) the 
process of handling corruption crimes in a protracted or delayed manner for no reason 
that could be accounted for, (c) handling corruption acts aimed at protecting the real 
perpetrator of corruption, (d) the handling of criminal acts of corruption contains 
elements of corruption, (e) barriers to handling criminal acts of corruption due to 
interference from the executive, judiciary, or legislative; or (f) other circumstances which, 
according to the consideration of the Police or Attorney General's Office, the handling of 
criminal acts of corruption is difficult to carry out properly and can be accounted for. 
Based on the description above it can be seen that among the three institutions that 
conduct investigations of corruption, the KPK is seen as a super-body institution with 
the extent of the investigative authority granted by the KPK Law, which authority is not 
possessed by other investigating agencies, even though the criminal acts investigated 
are equally corruption which is difficult to prove.   
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4. Implications for Arranging Authority for Investigation of Corruption Acts Against 
Efforts to Accelerate Criminal Acts of Corruption   
The problem of the authority of the investigation between the police investigator and the 
prosecutor's investigation began with the different interpretations of Article 284 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. This article in its implementation raises dissent between the 
police and the prosecutor's office. On the one hand the National Police believes that if a 
period of two years as referred to in article 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been 
past, the police have the authority to investigate “all” criminal acts, both general crimes 
and special crimes, including special criminal cases.8 
On the other hand, the Prosecutor's Office considers that a period of two years is only 
for handling cases of general crimes, meaning that any violation in the Criminal Code 
alone (material law) which becomes the authority of the Police if the transistor’s 
provisions are not revoked. Although Article 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code has 
not been revoked the prosecutor (according to the Prosecutor's version) is the sole 
investigator for cases of special crimes namely economic crime, corruption and 
subversion. Revocation of this provision is sufficient to provide exceptions to the 
prosecutor as the authority holder of investigations into special criminal acts; this is 
explained by Article 17 of Government Regulation No. 27 of 1983 concerning the 
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Code which states: “Investigation according 
to the provisions as referred to in Article 284 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code is carried out by prosecutors and other authorized investigating officials based on 
legislation”.  
The struggle for authorization investigations continued, the evidence of the Police Law 
No. 28 of 1997 is still trying to interpret the norms contained in Article 284 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code by raising the provisions of article 14 paragraph (1) letter a which reads: 
"In carrying out the tasks referred to in article 13, the Indonesian National Police 
conducts investigations and investigations into all criminal cases with procedural law 
and other legislation. Providing a leading role to the state police in investigating and 
investigating all criminal acts, there appears to be a strong implicit desire from the police 
to obtain all investigative powers against cases that are categorized as general crimes or 
special crimes.  
In connection with the task relationship between the police investigator and the 
prosecutor's investigator, a Police General who was last serving as the Head of the 
Metropolitan Jakarta Police should pay attention to Untung S Radjab's9 opinion that the 
inability of the police to carry out their duties and authority was not due to low or lack 
of juridical technical investigation assignments, but because of the struggle authority 
between prosecutors and police which leads to the struggle for sustenance and money; 
with the birth of the Criminal Procedure Code which is considered to have 
accommodated the police and the prosecutor's office in equality, it is like getting a pair 
of tigers in one sometimes that each target is ready to pounce on each other. Referring to 
Daniel S Lev's10  opinion that the relationship between police and prosecutors as a 
competition for authority is not solely because of fighting over power, prestige or 
sustenance, but because it only covers the lack of police who have not fully mastered the 
                                                             
8  Moh Hatta,  Loc.Cit.  
9  Untung S Radjab, (2003), Kedudukan dan Fungsi Polisi republik Indonesia dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan 
Berdasarkan UUD 1945, Bandung: CV Utomo, p. 341 
10  Ibid 
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juridical technique of investigation coupled with the urge to monopolize the authority 
of the investigator. In this connection, it is interesting to understand that  
“When governments tend to be more authoritarian, they will tolerate or be seen in 
corruption, such a government is likely to build anti-corruption institutions to 
manipulate access to corruption networks by emphasizing targeted authority to lower 
officials without known to the public”.11  
According to Saldi Isra,12 the KPK will continue to face external "disturbances" that have 
the potential to reduce the rate of efforts to eradicate corruption. While internally, the 
KPK must complete a pile of cases with limited personnel. Internal burdens can become 
heavier with plans to form KPK representatives in the regions, external disturbances, 
including: the emergence of a desire to revise the KPK Law, the KPK is still difficult to 
gain political support in strengthening and meeting internal needs.  
KPK as an institution whose existence and authority are given by law, its position is 
lower than that of other institutions mandated by the constitution. The KPK has a 
temporary function, that is, until there is no more extraordinary state of corruption, or 
before the police and prosecutors can carry out their duties and authority in eradicating 
Corruption Crimes properly. So that if problems arise with certain parties, it could be 
weakened by a revision of the law and other ways, such as those carried out by the 
House of Representatives some time ago that want to revise the KPK Law, which was 
reported by some people to do weakening against the KPK. 
In the implementation of this coordination and supervision, there were a number of 
problems, including personnel problems, if those who did this were investigators from 
the Police investigator and the Attorney General's loan who went to the area, and faced 
the regional police chief and the head of the High Prosecutor's Office who were far above 
their rank who carry out the coordination and supervision tasks, they will be 
psychologically and hierarchically difficult in the career path.13 
So far, administratively KPK investigators are still dependent on their original 
institutions, the KPK's independent establishment requires the need for the KPK to have 
its own investigators, no longer borrowing from other institutions. This is very 
important in order to avoid the possibility of withdrawal by the originating institution 
of the investigator, which has a large potential to disrupt institutional independence and 
the independence of the function of the KPK, which can guarantee institutional work to 
achieve the ideal goals expected from its formation.14 This happens because investigators 
in the KPK generally come from police investigators and prosecutors who are elected 
and appointed as KPK investigators. Indeed, the KPK should have investigators 
appointed themselves to better protect independence in carrying out such extensive 
investigative assignments given to the KPK. 
 
                                                             
11  Hollyer, J. R., & Wantchekon, L. (2014). Corruption and ideology in autocracies. The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 31(3): 499-533. 
12  Saldi Isra, (2017), Hukum Yang Terabaikan (Catatan Hukum Dua Tahun Pemerintahan Jokowi-JK), Jakarta: PT 
Kompas Media Nusantara, p.25-32 
13  Febri Diansyah, Donal Fariz and Emerson Yuntho, (2011), Penguatan Fungsi Koordinasi dan Supervisi KPK, 
Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW)- MSI-USAID, Jakarta, p. 17  
 14  Jimly Asshidiqie, (2008), Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia, Jakarta: Bhuana Ilmu Populer, p 879-
880  
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The disparity of the investigating institution shows that there is no synergistic and 
harmonious, thus impacting the ineffectiveness of the investigation of the crime itself. 
Police investigators who have been constitutionally from the beginning of the formation 
of this State have placed the responsibility of authority in the field of law enforcement, 
especially the investigation of corruption, institutionally very strong because it has 
human resources and infrastructure in all parts of Indonesia. Therefore, the hope to 
eradicate corruption in the country of Indonesia should strengthen the police 
institutionally, especially those that play a role in the process of investigating criminal 
acts of corruption.15 
In contrast, Jan S. Maringka argued that another solution, giving the authority to handle 
corruption cases only at one institution, namely the KPK. However, this authority only 
reaches the level of investigation and investigation minus prosecution. Prosecution is 
still being given to the Prosecutor's Office. This is intended to have a control mechanism 
in the settlement of corruption cases, so that excessive actions can be avoided in 
eradicating corruption. This method requires the improvement of the institutional 
reform of the Corruption Eradication Commission by adding facilities and personnel to 
reach all parts of Indonesia. This method will avoid friction between institutions in 
eradicating corruption so that institutional harmonization occurs in the context of 
eradicating corruption.16 
The author disagrees with Maringka above, if giving the authority to investigate 
Corruption Crimes only to the KPK, it means changing the general provisions already 
in force in the criminal procedural law itself, which has expressly stated that the 
investigator is a Polri investigator and PPNS, and this will change not a few existing 
legal provisions. If there were some exceptions to the investigation of Corruption, it 
would still be logical to be aware of the principle of lex specialis derogaat lex generalis, not 
to completely eliminate the authority of investigation by police investigators as stated 
above. Hence, in order to deal with welfare crime and corporate crime and cases that 
complicated the verification of the role of prosecutor investigators were more 
professional and capable compared to police investigators. 17  The problem of the 
investigation for the police is indeed a dilemma in spying on the burden of duty carried 
out by the police concerning public security and order. 
Unequal granting of authority to the three institutions authorized to investigate criminal 
acts of corruption, creates jealousy for other institutions. The granting of such broad 
authority to the KPK in investigating criminal acts of corruption, creates jealousy for the 
Police and the Attorney General's Office. However, the criminal act that will be 
investigated is a criminal act of corruption, which is complicated to prove it and has a 
big challenge because it deals with policy makers in this country. If the Police and the 
Attorney General's Office are also given wiretapping and confiscation authorities such 
as those owned by the KPK, it will accelerate the eradication of criminal acts of 
corruption. The KPK alone with one head office can do a lot of hand-catching (OTT) 
operations against suspected corruption perpetrators, especially if the police and the 
Attorney General's Office which have many representatives and human resources 
throughout Indonesia are given the same authority, will be able to reveal more 
corruption cases in area. 
                                                             
15   M. Aris Purnomo, Eko Soponyono, (2015). Rekonseptualisasi Penyidikan TPK oleh Polri Dalam Rangka 
Efektivitas Pemberantasan TPK, Jurnal Law Reform, Vol. 11, No.  2, p. 232 
16  Jan S. Maringka Loc. Cit, p. 58 
17  Rukmini, (2003), Perlindungan HAM mlalui Asas Praduga Tak Bersalah, Bandung: Alumni, p. 119  
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In connection with the formulation of the law, another problem is that if the law that has 
been formulated does not provide an easy solution in its application, then the legal 
officer must pay attention to the basis of refusal which is used as the joint of the rule and 
oriented on the values behind the legal provisions. It can also be said that the legal officer 
did not find explicit rules in the law regarding the choice of law so that he had to return 
to the principles which became the basis for the refusal of the law and follow those 
principles as a guide.18 This must indeed be done by the three institutions investigating 
criminal acts of corruption in response to the current arrangements. However, there is a 
great hope that reformulation of criminal law policy will be carried out in the field of 
providing criminal acts of corruption, regulating firmly, and synchronously the 
authority to investigate the three investigating institutions, so as to create an 
arrangement that can provide certainty, usefulness and public justice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The three institutions that have been given the authority to conduct investigations of 
corruption crimes administratively are separate separately, but functionally these three 
institutions should work together to accelerate the eradication of corruption in 
Indonesia. Nevertheless, in practice this is not the case, each institution tends to be 
shackled by the fragmentary and centric institutions that do not support the eradication 
of corruption. KPK as an extra-ordinary institution with a broader authority compared 
to the Police and Attorney General's Office, so it is called a super-body institution. This 
condition creates jealousy for other institutions in this case the Police and the Attorney 
General's Office, because they both deal with corruption crimes which are classified as 
extra-ordinary crimes, but have different powers, such as wiretapping and confiscation. 
In the same way, weaknesses in the investigation of corruption in the future must be 
strictly regulated about the authority of each investigator, with boundaries that are 
clearly not abstract, integral and synchronous in their arrangements among the three 
laws that give authority, namely the Police Law, Attorney General Law, and KPK Law 
as well as the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), following the regulations 
in their respective technical regulations. If the arrangement is in harmony and 
synchronous among the existing regulations, it will be used as a guideline for the three 
institutions in the future, not as problematic as they are now, by revising the existing 
provisions or making new provisions. 
 
  
                                                             
18  Roeslan Saleh, (2001). Penjabaran Pancasila dan UUD 45 Dalam Perundang-undangan. Jakarta: Aksara Baru, 
p. 14.  
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